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THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT: SHOULD IT APPLY TO
THE INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARING
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1985 New Mexico legislative session, a bill was introduced
to amend procedures by which minors are committed involuntarily for
treatment of mental illness and developmental disabilities.' The amend-
ment would have limited the minor's right to be present during his in-
voluntary commitment hearing, a right which the current Mental Health
and Developmental Disabilities Code grants to both minors and adults.2
The sponsor of the bill eventually withdrew the proposal from consid-
eration by the legislature and, for the time being, both adults and minors
will be permitted to attend their civil involuntary commitment hearings
in New Mexico without statutory restrictions. Although the proposed
amendment pertained to the minor's right to be present, the issue has
never been finally determined in the context of an adult's attendance at
his involuntary civil commitment hearing. Because neither the United
States Supreme Court nor the New Mexico Supreme Court has ruled on
the issue of whether due process requires an adult's presence during these
hearings, the issue is not fully resolved.3
The standard against which due process procedures in involuntary civil
I. HB143 was introduced by Representative Robert M. Hawk. A developmental disability is a
disability attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, autism or neurological dysfunction which
requires treatment similar to that provided persons with mental retardation. N.M.STAT. ANN. § -I-
3(H) (Repl. Pamp. 1984). A mental disorder or mental illness is a substantial disorder of an indi-
vidual's emotional processes, thought or cognition which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, or
capacity to recognize reality. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-3(N) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. §43-1-16.1.F (Repl. Pamp. 1984) currently provides:
At the commitment hearing, the minor shall at all times be represented by counsel;
have the right to present evidence, including the testimony of a mental health and
developmental disabilities professional of his own choosing; to cross examine wit-
nesses; have the right to a complete record of the proceedings; and have the right
to an expeditious appeal of an adverse ruling.
The proposal contained in HB143 would have added:
A minor shall have the right to be present at the commitment hearing unless the
court finds that the minor has competently waived the right to be present, or upon
a motion of any interested party, that the minor's presence would be substantially
detrimental to the minor's mental condition or ongoing treatment or habilitiation.
3. In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), the United States Supreme Court determined the
minimum due process required in the involuntary commitment of minors. The Court expressly left
the States free to provide more than the minimum due process. Id. at 607.
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commitment are measured is the sixth amendment.4 The sixth amendment
guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy and public trial by
jury, the right to be informed of the accusations, the right to confront
witnesses, the right to assistance of counsel, and the right to present
witnesses. These fundamental rights are obligatory on the states in crim-
inal proceedings.'
In the recent decades of mental health law reforms, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that the involuntary hospitalization of
adults in psychiatric hospitals is a "massive curtailment of liberty" that
"requires due process protection. "6 The involuntary commitment of adults
must be consistent with constitutional principles of liberty and due pro-
cess. Involuntary commitment implicates procedural protections that are
similar to those required in criminal proceedings.7
The Supreme Court established in O'Connor v. Donaldson that a state
may not confine, without more, an individual who is not dangerous and
who is capable of living outside an institution with the help of family or
friends.8 Regarding the procedures by which the state may commit adults
4. The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments essentially require that the
procedures by which an individual is deprived of liberty must be fundamentally fair. J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA, & J. N. YOUNG, CONSTrrUTiONAL LAW 558 (2d ed. 1983). Because virtually all types of
commitment proceedings which are labeled "civil," including juvenile delinquency and incorrigibility
hearings, commitment of the developmentally disabled or mentally ill, and conservatorships, result
in the deprivation of liberty, due process scrutiny is warranted. The consequent loss of liberty which
derives from involuntary institutionalization is considered by many to be analogous to incarceration.
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967) (the privilege against self-incrimination in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding). Thus, legal commentators and the courts frequently look to the criminal
justice model and due process standards set by the sixth amendment in developing involuntary civil
commitment procedures. See, e.g., Slovenko, Criminal Justice Procedures in Civil Commitment,
24 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1977); Stromberg and Stone, Statute: A Model State Law on Civil Commitment
of the Mentally Ill, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 275 (1983); S. Brakel, J. Parry, and B. Weiner, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1985); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.
Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds. 414 U.S. 473(1974). The New Mexico Supreme
Court has found that, "the civil commitment process, though technically a civil proceeding, has
elements of both criminal and civil proceedings ...with some of the rights guaranteed to criminal
defendants applicable to the defendants in commitment hearings." In re Valdez, 88 N.M. 338, 341,
540 P.2d 818, 821 (1975) (citing Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d. 794 (lst Cir. 1973)) (adopted clear
and convincing evidence as standard of proof in involuntary adult civil commitment).
5. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront witnesses); Gideon v. Wainright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (right to cross-
examine witnesses).
6. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490 (1980) (citing Humphrey v. Cadey, 405 U.S. 504, 509
(1972), and Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)). The Court ruled that a prisoner, even
though he is already in the custody of the state, is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine
the appropriateness of commitment. Also see, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
7. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) aff'd sub
nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
8. 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). The Court specifically declined to address the issue of whether the
state may confine a nondangerous individual for the purpose of providing treatment. Id. at 573.
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without their consent, the Court has ruled specifically only on the issue
of burden of proof, requiring that states must prove dangerousness by
clear and convincing evidence.9 Legislatures and courts have responded
to O'Connor v. Donaldson by according procedural protections to the
loss of liberty in civil commitment cases similar to those protections
accorded in criminal proceedings; rights that are constitutionally guar-
anteed for criminal proceedings, such as mandatory provision of coun-
sel,'" have been established for adult commitment proceedings by state
legislative action" and through state and federal court interpretation of
due process requirements. 2
Because the United States Supreme Court has not determined exactly
what process is due in commitment proceedings, the states continue to
wrestle with the task of developing commitment criteria and procedures
that balance the government's need to protect citizens from dangerous
persons and to provide treatment to individuals against the individual's
constitutionally protected interest in liberty."' Recommendations from
9. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). "Dangerous" has subsequently been established
by showing merely that the individual has been convicted of committing a criminal act. Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983) (a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity was sufficient
evidence of dangerousness to permit automatic commitment of a defendant accused of shoplifting,
a nonviolent crime against property).
10. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11. For example, forty-five states now require a hearing; fourteen states require a jury trial where
the individual requests it. Brakel, supra note 4, Table 2.7. The majority of states including New
Mexico, now require notice, appointment of counsel, limitations on length of commitment, and
include provisions regarding who may initiate commitment proceedings as well as requirements for
periodic review of the commitment. Van Duizend, McGraw, Keitlitz, An Overview of State Invol-
untary Civil Commitment Statutes, 8 MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW REP. 328.
The New Mexico Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code provides adults the following
procedural safeguards: notice, mandatory representation by counsel, presentation of evidence (in-
cluding testimony by an independent expert), cross-examination, the right to be present at the hearing,
and the right to a jury trial. N.M. STAT. ANN. §43-1-11(B) (1984 Repl. Pamp.). New Mexico
currently accords minors similar due process protections as it accords juveniles in criminal, delin-
quency, and incorrigibility proceedings. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-16 and-16.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §32-1-27 and -31 (Repl. Pamp. 1984) Compare The Children's Code, N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1-1 through 45. New Mexico does not provide minors a jury trial on the issue of
commitment.
12. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974),
on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D.
Wis. 1976) (the court found that due process requires notice, right to counsel, a full hearing, time
limitations on length of commitment, a statement of the basis of proposed commitment, standard
of proof, jury trial, commitment only when commitment is the least drastic alternative, notice that
statements made to a psychiatrist may be used in commitment proceedings, and application of the
same standards of admissibility with regard to hearsay evidence as required in criminal proceedings);
Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1983) (the court extended the privilege against testifying
against oneself to civil commitment proceedings); Heryford v. Parker. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. Ct.
App. 1968) (the court required separate counsel for minor where parent sought his commitment).
13. Compare Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals for Change, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY
LAw REP. 73, 78-79 (1977) and S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY, & B. WEINER, supra note 4 Table 2.7.
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both the legal and mental health communities attempt to balance a range
of competing societal values. On one end of the scale is the traditionally
deep regard for fundamental liberty concepts-freedom from bodily re-
straint, confinement, invasion of privacy, and interference with private
decisions affecting the way in which an individual chooses to live his
life. On the other end of the scale are the doctrines of police power and
parens patriae through which the government seeks to protect society
from dangerous individuals, to provide custodial care for those incapable
of caring for themselves, and to benefit the person who is the subject of
commitment. 4
Some observers believe that the parens patriae power should encom-
pass the ability to confine and treat persons not only where they may be
dangerous to themselves or others but also where commitment and treat-
ment would be in their best interests." This "best interests" rationale
factors heavily into discussions about the extent to which due process
protections established to guard against the erroneous loss of liberty in
criminal prosecutions should be applied to guard against the erroneous
loss of liberty in civil commitment proceedings.16 Whether an individual
should be given the right to be present at his commitment hearing raises
"best interest" arguments which focus chiefly on the concern that hearing
testimony about his psychological status will further debilitate his mental
health and impair relationships which are vital to his recovery.
The focus of this Comment is limited primarily to exploring the nature
of the right to be present at the involuntary civil commitment hearing in
the context of due process rights of adults. 7 However, because the dangers
associated with erroneous commitment extend equally to children and
may be even greater for children because commitment interrupts partic-
14. Stromberg and Stone, Statute: A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally I11,
20 HARVARD J. ON LEGIS. 275 (1983). See also In re Matter of Valdez, 88 N.M. 338, 342, 540 P.
2d. 818, 822 (1975), citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
15. See generally Slovenko, Criminal Justice Procedures in Civil Commitment, 24 WAYNE LAW
REVIEW 1, 12-19 (1977). Some would interpret "dangerous to others" to include not only physical
risks such as suicide or the inability to obtain basic necessities that actually threatens survival, but
almost any harm stemming from mental disability or mental illness. E.g., Chodoff, The Case for
Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 496, 500 (1976).
16. One view suggests that the attorney representing institutionalized clients should be skeptical
of his client's position and should assume a role of counselor or ombudsman rather than the traditional
role of advocate and in this way seek to arrive at the "best solution" for the parties involved. Brakel,
Legal Advocacy for Persons Confined in Mental Hospitals, 5 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REP. 274
(1980).
17. Although the fourteenth amendment is not for adults alone, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13
(1967), and although a number of court decisions have recognized that children are entitled to the
same categories of rights as adults, Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976) (privacy); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (access to benefits created by state law);
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (speech); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) and Breed v. Jones 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (physical liberty; sixth amendment
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ipation in the typical educational setting and program, concepts and in-
formation which may be equally useful in the development of procedures
for the involuntary commitment of children are briefly presented in foot-
notes where appropriate. Part I of the Comment discusses the source,
underlying purpose, and conditions of the defendant's presence during
criminal proceedings. Part II discusses the role of presence during civil
commitment proceedings in the context of the Eldridge balancing test
and suggests criteria by which presence might be limited. The Comment
concludes that because the consequences of a finding of mental disability
are severe and because the risk of error is great, the individual who is
the subject of an involuntary civil commitment proceeding must be ac-
corded the right to be present so that he may pursue every opportunity
to avoid erroneous commitment.
II. THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT DURING
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
A. The Source and Purpose of the Right to be Present
The sixth amendment guarantees that "in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." Although the Constitution does not specifically address the
defendant's presence, the Supreme Court has recognized since 1892 that
the accused's presence in a criminal proceeding is inherent in principles
of fairness and accuracy. '8 The accused's presence at "every step of his
trial . . . is . . . one of the most basic rights guaranteed by the Con-
frontation Clause"' 9 because a defendant's "life or liberty may depend
upon the aid which, by his personal presence, he may give to counsel
and to the court and triers .... "20 Thus, presence is viewed as an essential
component of the sixth amendment rights which the United States Su-
preme Court has ruled the states must accord to criminal defendants: the
guarantees); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (personal security); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970) (standard of proof in delinquency proceedings), the constitutional protection accorded
those rights is not necessarily identical to that accorded similar rights of adults. States possess greater
power to regulate the conduct of minors than of adults. The distinction in application of constitutional
protections is based on the minor's vulnerability to harm, lack of mature judgment, and the deference
traditionally accorded family autonomy and authority. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See
generally Teitelbaum and Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process Rights and Their
Application, 12 FAM. L. Q. 153(1978).
18. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892); Faretta v. California, 422 United States 806,
816, (1975) (citing, Snyder v. Massachusettes, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)). Rule 43 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure recognizes the fundamental relationship between personal attendance and
fairness and requires the defendant's presence at every stage of the trial.
19. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970).
20. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 578 (1884).
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right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, 2 ' the right to
have assistance of counsel appointed by the court,22 the defendant's ability
to assist his counsel at trial,23 and the ability to speak in one's own
defense.24 These rights, granted personally to the accused rather than to
his counsel,25 are essential to the accused's ability to present a fair and
full defense.
The presence of the defendant during his criminal trial can affect the
fairness of the proceedings and enhance the accuracy of the fact-finding
in several ways. First, the defendant who is present during his trial can
assist or even supercede his attorney and ensure that his attorney presents
a vigorous defense.26 Second, the defendant may identify discrepancies
or motive in the testimony of the witnesses and immediately bring these
observations to the attention of his attorney.27 Third, the mere presence
of the defendant may reach the conscience of witnesses and inhibit them
from lying or test their recollection.28 Fourth, a defendant's presence
allows him to present himself and his demeanor to the jury so that they
may assess the credibility of his testimony.29 Finally, the defendant's
presence may influence the outcome of the proceeding by giving the jury
an opportunity to observe him with compassion.3"
B. The Right to be Present During Criminal Proceedings is not
Absolute
The Court has ruled that the defendant's right to be present during
criminal prosecutions is not absolute and is limited under or waived by
certain circumstances. 3 Where the defendant is so disruptive during the
21. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
22. Argersinger v. Hamplin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1972).
23. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
24. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898).
25. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to self-
representation under the sixth amendment provided that the decision to proceed without counsel is
made voluntarily and intelligently):
The Sixth Amendment does not merely provide that a defense be made for the
accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. It is
the accused, not counsel, who must be . . . "confronted with the witnesses against
him," and who must be accorded "compulsory process for obtaining witnessses
in his favor... " The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is
he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails. Id. at 819 (emphasis added).
26. The defendant's ability to assist his counsel is "one of the primary advantages of the right
to be present." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934).
27. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
28. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965).
29. Id. (citing, Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).
30. Lewis, 146 U.S. at 372 (citing Prine v. Commonwealth, 18 Pa. 103, 104 (1851); State v.
Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 767-68, 355 P.2d 323, 327 (1960).
31. Allen, 397 U.S. at 337. The historical development of the defendant's right to be present
during criminal proceedings and the Allen decision limiting that right are discussed in The Supreme
Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 90 (1970).
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trial that it is impossible to continue, a trial may proceed in the absence
of a defendant until he is ready to conduct himself in a manner appropriate
to the dignity of the proceedings. 2 A defendant's presence is considered
essential to enhance his opportunity to defend against erroneous fact-
finding and conviction.33 To the extent that the defendant's presence would
not enhance his defense, his absence will not frustrate the fairness of the
proceedings.34 However, the accused's presence has been found unnec-
essary to his defense only where the jury viewed the scene of the crime
in the presence of his attorney. 5 The Court has never held that the de-
fendant's presence during testimony of witnesses or presentation of evi-
dence might be useless.
The Court has recognized that an attorney acting in the absence of his
client may not be able to present a complete defense; the defendant's life
or liberty may depend on the assistance he may give to his attorney when
he is present during voir dire of the jury, cross-examination, presentation
of evidence, instructions to the jury and other stages of a trial.36 A de-
fendant may waive his right to be present either by his express consent
or by his actions.37 Thus, where a defendant who is not in the custody
of the court voluntarily absents himself from the trial, his absence con-
stitutes a waiver of the right to be present.38
The defendant may lose his right to be present if his conduct is "so
disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot
be carried on with him in the courtroom." 39 Although the Court has
recognized circumstances under which the defendant's right to be present
in the courtroom may be limited or waived, the Court nevertheless con-
siders the right to presence as one of "the most basic rights guaranteed
by the Confrontation Clause"'  and cautions that courts "must indulge
every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional rights." 4
Further emphasizing the importance of the right to presence, the Court
requires that 1) the judge first warn the disruptive defendant that he will
32. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343.
33. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). Presence is required where it bears a substantial
relationship to the fairness of the proceeding and the fullness of the opportunity to defend. Id. at
105.
34. Id. at 108.
35. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). The Court held that the defendant's right
to a fair hearing was not denied where the jury, accompanied by defendant's counsel, viewed the
scene of the crime in the absence of the defendant, with no statement of evidence during the viewing,
and where the defendant had access to a stenographic record of the viewing.
36. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 578 (1884).
37. Allen, 397 U.S. at 342-43.
38. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912); Falk v. U.S., 15 App. D.C. 446, 454
(1899).
39. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343.
40. Id. at 338.
41. Id. at 343 (citing, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
Winter 1987]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
be removed if he continues to conduct himself in a disorderly manner,
and 2) the defendant must regain his right to be present in the courtroom
"as soon as" he is willing to comport with the decorum and respect
required.4 2 Justice Douglas suggests that there may be circumstances
where due process might require solutions other than exclusion, citing
the defendant who is mentally disabled as one example.43
III. THE ROLE OF PRESENCE IN ADULT
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS
"The function of legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous
decisions."" In determining the adequacy with which the legal process
performs its function, a court must consider the following Eldridge for-
mula:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's in-
terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.45
A. The Nature of the Deprivation
Applying the above formula to the individual's right to be present at
his commitment hearing, a court must first consider the nature of the
private interest. How the court views this private interest plays a signif-
icant role in the outcome of the balance; the importance of the interest
will determine the weight assigned to it and will govern the accuracy of
the procedure required.' Commitment to a psychiatric facility is a "mas-
sive curtailment of liberty '47 that involves a loss of liberty, privacy, and
freedom of association.48 Institutionalized persons are subjected to locks,
inspection of personal possessions, and regulation of their activities, daily
routines, meals, and hygiene.
In addition, there is reason to believe that a "person mistakenly placed
42. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343.
43. Id. at 351-57 (Douglas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
44. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) and In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967).
"Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in instances, which
might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact
and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy. Due process of law is the primary and indispensible
foundation of individual freedom." Id. at 19-20.
45. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
46. Teitelbaum and Ellis, supra note 17 at 175.
47. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 490.
48. Gross v. Pomerleau, 465 F. Supp. 1167, 1173 (D.Md. 1979).
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in a mental hospital might suffer severe emotional and psychic harm."49
Various debilitating and lasting consequences flow from involuntary civil
commitment: the loss of basic skills, deterioration of social skills, depres-
sion, and submissiveness.5° Significant detrimental consequences also
follow an individual beyond the term of involuntary civil commitment in
the form of social stigma." This stigma can be as debilitating as that
flowing from criminal conviction 2 and occurs even where the commit-
ment is brief.53
Finally, the institutionalized person's right to withhold consent for
medical treatment is limited. He may be subjected to straitjacketing,
aversive conditioning, psychosurgery, psychopharmacological therapy,
and electroshock therapy. 4
Given the confinement, the loss of freedom of association, the inherent
stigma that attaches to the briefest commitment, the accompanying loss
of social and personal skills, and the subjection of the individual to
therapies that seek to modify his behavior, involuntary civil commitment
to a psychiatric facility constitutes a substantial deprivation of liberty.
Indeed, some have concluded that involuntary hospitalization in a psy-
49. Mathews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
50. Cook, The Substantive Due Process Rights of Mentally Disabled Clients, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY
LAW REP. 346, 347-48 (1983). The consequences of institutionalization are also severe for minors.
Children committed to mental institutions are separated from the familiar surroundings of home.
Instead of parents and sisters and brothers, they live with strangers. Their education is interrupted.
The chances are very great that they will suffer substandard care, Hook, CONG. Q. WKLY. RPT.,
June 15, 1985 at 1168 (reporting on Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Persons: Hearings
on S. 974 before Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources Subcomm. on the Handicapped,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. April 1-3 (1985) (investigating cases of violence, neglect, and substandard
living conditions in state mental institutions); lowered self-esteem, Szasz, The Child As Involuntary
Mental Patient: The Threat of Child Therapy to the Child's Dignity, Privacy, and Self-Esteem, 14
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1005 (1977); reinforcement of aberrant behavior, O'Boyle, Voluntary Mental
Patients: A Realistic Balancing of the Competing Interests of Parent, Child, and State. 37 SW.L.J.
1179 (1984); lowered social competence, Teitelbaum and Ellis, supra note 17; and impairment of
intelligence, id., and Stemlicht and Siegel, Institutional Residence and Intellectual Functioning, 12
J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY RESEARCH 119 (1968) cited in Szasz, supra.
51. Teitelbaum and Ellis, supra note 17, at nn. 127-134.
52. The loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss
of freedom from confinement. It is indisputable that commitment to a mental
hospital "can engender adverse social consequences to the individual" and that
"[wlhether we label this phenomena 'stigma' or choose to call it something
else . ..we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant
impact on the individual."
Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492, (citing Addington v. Texas).
See also, Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979); Gross v. Pomerleau, 465 F. Supp. 1167,
1173 (D. Md. 1979), (citing Stamus v. Leonardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 449 (S.D. Iowa 1976)); In re
Ballay, 157 U.S. App. D.C. 59, 482 F.2d 648, 668-69 (1973); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378,
393 (M.D. Ala. N.D. 1974), rev'd and remanded on other grounds 651 F.2d 387 (1981).
53. Gross v. Pomerleau, 465 F. Supp. 1167 (D. Md. 1979).
54. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 385 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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chiatric facility is an even more substantial deprivation of liberty than is
incarceration based on a criminal conviction. 5
B. The Risk of Erroneous Commitment
1. The Risk of Error In Determination and Recommendation
Underlying any commitment policy is the "uncertainty of diagno-
sis . . . and the tentativeness of professional judgment" inherent in psy-
chiatric diagnosis.' The reliability and consistency with which professionals
are able to diagnose mental illness are extremely low.57 Professionals
examining the same individual may reach the same diagnosis only fifty
percent of the time.58 The rate of error in predicting dangerousness or
inability to function in the community upon release from an institution
ranges from forty-four to ninety-five percent.59 Nevertheless, lay people,
55. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. at 384; Gross, 465 F. Supp. at 1173.
56. Authorities from both the legal and the mental health professions question the accuracy of
psychiatric diagnosis. See O'Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 378-379 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); J. ZISKIN,
COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY at 1-23 (2d ed. 1975).
The New Mexico Supreme Court has also recognized the difficulties inherent in psychiatric
diagnosis. In re Valdez, 88 N.M. 338, 343, 540 P.2d 818, 823 (1975).
57. Rickles, Howard, Lipman, Covi, Park and Uhlenhuth, Differential Reliability in Rating
Psychopathology and Global Improvement, 26 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 320 (1970); Rosenhan, On
Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973) (eight mock patients, pretending to "hear
voices," presented themselves at various mental hospitals; all were examined by psychiatrists,
admitted and continued in confinement even after the mock patients had discontinued their "symp-
toms"); Ennis and Litwak, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974); Werner, Psychiatrists' Judgments of Dangerousness On
An Acute Care Unit, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 263 (1984) (correlation between actual violence and
psychiatrists' predictions was 14%; Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 439 (1974); Perlin, Mental Patient Advocacy by a Patient Advocate, 54 PSYCHIATRIC
Q. 169 (1982); Reinherz, Clinical Assessments and Maternal Judgments: Concurrent and Predictive
Relationships, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 236 (1984) (Study required mothers, social workers
and psychiatrists to make predicitons regarding the future. behaviors of kindergarten students in the
areas of behavioral and emotional functioning, academics, and school adjustment; when the children
were assessed again in the third grade, it was found that social workers had the greatest success at
predicting behaviors.); Zusman and Simon, Differences in Repeated Psychiatric Examinations of
Litigants to a Lawsuit, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1300, 1304 (1983); Marcus, Reality and Psychiatric
Reality in Litigation, 4 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 167 (1983); Dershowitz, Psvchiatr' in the
Legal Process: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, 4 TRIAL 29, 33 (1968).
58. Wilson, THE RIGHTS OF ADOLESCENTS IN THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 91 (1978).
59. Ziskin, J. COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 1-23 (2d ed. 1975).
The pseudo-patients were instructed to immediately discontinue their symptoms
once they were admitted; psychiatrists and other institution personnel failed to
recognize their normalcy, even though observing on a daily basis. "Once the
impression has been formed that the patient is schizophrenic, the expectation is
that he will continue to be schizophrenic."
Rosenhan, On Being Sane In Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250, 253 (1973).
See also Special Articles Series: Civil Commitment, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW. REP. 57, 87
(1977); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. at 378 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (psychiatric predictions
of dangerousness inaccurate two-thirds of the time).
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legislatures, and judges give extraordinary weight to the judgment of
psychiatrists and psychologists. 60
A number of factors affects the accuracy of the diagnosis and the
recommendation for commitment. First, the diagnostic measures em-
ployed are unavoidably subjective; there is no objective measure of human
behavior. Second, the diagnostician relies on reports of the individual's
conduct from parents, family members, teachers, other community mem-
bers, and mental health workers and staff treating the patient. The day-
to-day lives of these people have been affected by the conduct of a difficult
family member or disruptive individual; their own attitudes, frustrations,
embarrassment, and preferences are unavoidably woven into their de-
scriptions of the individual's behavior. Although their motives may not
be malevolent, their interests may be quite different from those of the
individual who will be committed. 6'
A third distortion of the accuracy of the diagnosis and ultimate rec-
60. E.g. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (Courts must show deference to the judgment
exercised by a qualified professional). One study estimated that 56% of commitments in Idaho did
not satisfy the dangerousness criteria. Wickham, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill In Idaho and
the Need for Reform, 16 IDAHO L. REV. 211 (1980). See also Perlin, Mental Patient Advocacy by
a Patient Advocate, 54 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 169 (1982). Even attorneys appointed to represent persons
at commitment hearings typically defer to the judgment of the psychiatrists seeking commitment of
the attorney's clients. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally
I11, 44 TEX. L. REV. 424, 450 (1965).
61. It has been suggested that some police officers or family members seeking commitment of
an individual are motivated at least in part by a desire to "[rid] themselves of a troubling presence."
Andalman and Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a
Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43 (1974). An example of this dichotomy of interests arises
where parents seek to commit their minor children. It is traditionally presumed that children's best
interests are adequately represented by their parents. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Yet, the
Court has recognized that there are times when a child's best interests may need special protection
by the state and has overruled the traditional deference to family decisions in order to extend special
protections in the areas of child labor, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); abortion,
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); and abuse and neglect, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1981) (clear and convincing standard applied to parental rights termination proceedings). Courts
allow the state to intervene over parental objections to provide medical treatment and to prevent
parents from seeking off-beat treatment for their children. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County
Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. N.D. 1967), aff'd 390 U.S. 598 (1968); see People ex rel.
Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952);
Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974); In Re Custody of a
Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978), aff'd on rehearing, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d
836 (1979).
Federal and state courts recognize that the interests of parents and their children may diverge in
cases of commitment and incorrigibility proceedings. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir.
1968) (the court recognized that the interests of the parent and child may be different and required
separate counsel for a minor whose mother sought to have him committed); In re Sippy, 97 A.2d
455 (D.C. 1953) (the court recognized the parent as an antagonistic party where the mother sought
to have her daughter committed to a psychiatric facility and ruled that the mother could not waive
the privilege of confidentiality with regard to her daughter's physician's testimony and that the
daughter's interests could not be adequately represented by the mother's attorney); In re Henry G.,
28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 104 Cal. Rep. 585 (1972) (the court recognized that a breakdown in the family
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ommendation to commit may arise where a family member seeks com-
mitment of the individual. This situation creates a conflict of interest for
the psychiatrist where the family member is both the source of financial
compensation, and the most available source of information.62 A similar
conflict may arise where the state, seeking commitment of an individual,
employs a mental health professional to evaluate the individual. The
diagnostician may be assuming conflicting roles in his position as state's
witness and his relationship as a doctor to his patient.
A recent development in New Mexico that gives rise to other conflicts
of interests is the proliferation of private mental hospitals which solicit
patients through competitive television, radio, and newspaper advertising.
The development of private profit and nonprofit institutions is of particular
concern because the number of commitments, length of stay, and type
of treatment will directly affect the facility's solvency. The mental health
community will have less incentive to oppose those who wish to have
family members committed and greater incentive to find symptoms sup-
porting commitment. Where the mental health professional who serves
as a director or staff member or part owner of such a facility also makes
diagnoses and treatment recommendations, he does so with the awareness
relationship could result from the parent's conduct as well as from the child's and found the mother's
testimony alone to be insufficient to support a finding of incorrigibility).
Recent data on the frequency of child abuse, neglect and sexual molestation within families who
have a handicapped child clearly suggests that Parham reliance on parental judgment in committing
children should be reconsidered. Diamond and Jaudes, ChildAbuse In a Cerebral Palsied Population,
25 DEVELOPMENTAL MED. AND CHILD NEUROLOGY 169 (1983). "There is a relatively high frequency
of children with developmental problems among populations of abused and neglected children." Id.
at 169. The authors also found that 20% of the 89 children studied who had cerebral palsy were
abused by their families. See also Solomons, Child Abuse and Developmental Disability, 21 DE-
VELOPMENTAL MED. AND CHILD NEUROLOGY 101 (1979). The author reports that the estimates of
abused children who have a mental or physical deviation range from 29% to 70%. It is not established
whether the handicapping conditions preceded the occurrence of abuse or may have been a result
of it. But see, Starr, The Contribution of Handicapping Conditions to Child Abuse, 4 ToPics EARLY
CHILDHOOD SPECIAL EDUC. 55 (1984).
Data on the increase in abuse during times of parental stress emphasizes that parents may not
always be able to act in the best interests of their children. Madonia, The Trauma of Unemployment
and Its Consequences, 64 SOCIAL CASEWORK 482 (1983); Hensy, Intervention in Child Abuse, 25
DEVELOPMENTAL MED. AND CHILD NEUROLOGY 606 (1983); Solomons, supra, at 103. See also
Comment, Voluntary Minor Mental Patients: A Realistic Balancing of the Competing Interests of
Parents, Child, and State, 37 SW. L.J. 1179, 1188 (1984); Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental
Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CAL. L. REV. 840 (1974); Teitelbaum and Ellis,
supra note 17; SCHETKEY & BENEDEK, CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW (1980).
62. ScHETKEY & BENEDEK, supra, note 61. There is no evidence documenting whether psychiatrists
do, in fact, deny family members' requests that individuals be committed. Mental Health Treatment
for Minors, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REP. 460, 464 (1978). Indeed, since the passage of com-
mitment statutes allowing parents to commit their minor children, the greatest increases of institu-
tionalization have occurred in the population under 15 years of age. Comment, Voluntary Minor
Mental Patients: A Realistic Balancing of the Competing Interests of Parents, Child, and State, 37
SW. L.J. 1179, 1188 (1984).
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that the fiscal success of the facility may depend upon the recommen-
dations he makes regarding treatment.
A more subtle conflict can arise between the treatment needs of the
individual and the philosophy of the institution with which the psychiatrist
is associated. Mental health professionals may be influenced by the ad-
missions policies of various institutions rather than by the need for hos-
pitalization or availability of indicated treatment programs.63 Psychiatric
diagnoses may also reflect personal and social values. 64
Finally, even though mental health researchers have recognized that
great harm has been done to families and patients by the use of unsub-
stantiated diagnoses and models,65 developments in tort liability have
placed the psychological community in a situation which encourages
overprediction, overconfinement, and overtreatment. The mental health
professional is more likely to incur liability for failing to predict dan-
gerousness than for prescribing institutionalization for a nondangerous
individual.' This situation is particularly troubling when one considers
the consequences for an individual erroneously committed: confinement,
subjection to various invasive therapies, possible loss of personal and
social skills, and the
terrifying possibility that ... he will be exposed to physical, emo-
tional and general mental agony. Confined with those who are insane,
told repeatedly that he is insane and indeed treated as insane, it does
not take much for a man to question his own sanity and in the end
to succumb to some mental aberration ... 67
The mental health profession's own studies reveal the risk of error and
harm inherent in any involuntary commitment. 68 The subjectivity of the
diagnostic evaluation, the reliance of the diagnosis on reports from in-
63. Mental Health Treatment for Minors, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REP. 460, 464 (1978).
64. Marcus, Reality and Psychiatric Reality in Litigation, 4 AM. J. OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 167
(1983); Dershowitz, supra, note 57. C. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT, MENTAL ILLNESS
AND THE LAW 42 (1982). One example is the intelligence tests used in diagnosis of developmental
disabilities. The tasks required are related to experiences familiar to members of the dominant culture
so that the performance of members of minority cultures may not reflect their true capabilities.
Teitelbaum and Ellis, supra, note 17, at 189.
65. Osmond, Dangerous Psychological Hypotheses, II J. ORTHOMOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 216
(1982).
66. Dershowitz, supra note 57, at 33. One psychiatrist has written that "the profession's over-
selling of its abilities during the past decades is coming home to roost." Appelbaum, The Expansion
of Liability for Patients' Violent Acts, 34 HosP. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 13, 14 (1984), com-
menting on Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d. 334 (1976).
See also Slovenko, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 402 (1973).
67. United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1073 (2d Cir. 1969) (considering
procedures by which prisoners were placed in mental hospitals).
68. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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terested parties, the opportunities giving rise to conflicts of interests, the
tendency toward unnecessary commitment, and the deference accorded
the mental health community increase the likelihood of error in some
component of the commitment decision. The error may occur in diagnosis,
in the type of commitment ordered (institutionalization rather than out-
patient treatment), or in the treatment prescribed (psychotropic drug ther-
apy rather than behavior modification programs).69
2. The Value of The Presence of The Individual
Under the Eldridge formulation, procedures are not considered inad-
equate merely because a high risk of error has been established. It is
necessary to show that a given procedure will modify that risk. The Model
Law developed and approved by the American Psychiatric Association
extends the right to presence to the civil commitment proceeding,7" rec-
ognizing that "presence at the hearing is a[n] historically valued safeguard
against arbitrary decisions." 7 ' The presence of the individual who is the
subject of the proceedings is a component of the ability to fully exercise
the rights of confrontation, cross-examination of witnesses, representation
by counsel, and the ability to speak in one's own defense.72 The value
of cross-examination lies in "exposing falsehood and bringing out the
truth." 73 The individual's presence may be useful in "bringing out the
truth" in the involuntary civil commitment proceeding in several ways.
First, the individual can assist his attorney in exposing motive and pointing
out discrepancies in the testimony of family members. Second, the in-
dividual can present his own version of the circumstances leading to the
commitment proceeding. Third, the individual's presence during the pro-
ceedings affords the judge or jury74 the opportunity to personally observe
him and may influence the weight given other testimony in determining
the disposition of his commitment. Fourth, the individual who is present
69. The foregoing discussion of the consequences of institutionalization and the difficulties of
diagnosis, prediction, and treatment should not be taken as an argument that all treatment is ineffective
or abused or that all residential commitments are inappropriate. However it is not necessary to
dismiss the very real needs, dangers, and problems presented by the mentally disordered to conclude
that every measure should be taken to avoid the substantial risk of harm that erroneous commitment
presents to adults and minors alike.
70. Stromberg and Stone, Statute: A Model State Law On Civil Commitment of the Mentally II1,
20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 337 (1983).
71. Id.
72. See supra, text accompanying notes 18-26.
73. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404.
74. Fourteen states provide a jury trial if requested in commitment proceedings. Brakel, supra
note 4, Table 2.7. New Mexico provides a jury trial if the patient requests it in proceedings for
extended commitment. N.M. STAT. ANN. §43-1-12(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
[Vol. 17
THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
may personally object to the type of commitment.75 Fifth, the New Mexico
Code requires a written plan prescribing the services and treatment that
comprise an appropriate treatment program.76 Where the state seeks to
extend the commitment of one already confined, the individual can verify
whether he is receiving the services prescribed.
Finally, fundamental fairness and "respect for the individual which is
the lifeblood of the law" 77 require his presence because an individual
who "has been denied the opportunity to be heard in his own defense
has lost something indispensible, however convincing the ex parte show-
ing." 78 The individual has an interest in simply being able to witness a
proceeding which is of such enormous personal consequence.
Some observers believe that the presence of a person who is the subject
of a commitment proceeding is equally if not more critical to the pre-
vention of error than is the presence of the defendant in a criminal trial.79
Many jurisdictions permit evidence in civil commitment hearings which
would normally be inadmissible in other court proceedings."0 Conse-
quently, the recommendation to institutionalize may be founded largely
on out of court statements."' The diagnosis is based not only on the
subject's performance on diagnostic instruments outside of the hearing,
but also, for example, on information the diagnostician has received from
family members, caretakers if he is already institutionalized, and prior
psychiatric records. The information given by a relative may be tainted
by motive or skewed by faulty memory or colored by the relative's
personal frustrations and concerns with the individual.8 2 Thus, the psy-
chiatrist may base the diagnosis and recommendation on disputed facts
never presented to the fact-finder. Medical or institution reports may
introduce the additional problem of ambiguity of terms when the original
75. The New Mexico Code requires that commitment be consistent with the least drastic means.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §43-1-11(C)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1984). An individual may not be able to live
completely independently but may function well in a half-way house or group home, or he may be
able to function independently so long as he takes medication to control his symptoms or behaviors.
There is also some evidence that individuals are committed or their commitments extended merely
because they are without financial resources or families. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT,
MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE LAW (1982). If the patient is present at the commitment hearing during
the psychiatrist's recommendations, he may present his own perception of his needs, capabilities,
and preferences.
76. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§43-1-9, 43-1-1 l(C)(2) and (3) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
77. Allen, 397 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 116 (1934).
79. Civil Commitment, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REP. 57, 105-06 (1977). At least three courts
have ruled that the same standards of admissibility must be applied to civil commitment proceedings
as are applied to criminal proceedings: Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1130; Doremus
v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975), Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note. 12.
80. BRAKEL, PARRY, & YOUNG, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 66 (3d ed. 1985).
81. See Civil Commitment, supra note 79.
82. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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author is not present during the hearing to interpret and clarify. Unless
the person who is the subject of the commitment proceeding is present,
the content and basis of such testimony cannot be fully challenged. Coun-
sel alone cannot know whether the psychiatrist's testimony is based on
disputed fact. The individual who is to be committed must be present to
assist his attorney in cross-examination.
Further, the psychological evaluation itself takes place outside the hear-
ing. The individual typically does not have counsel present during the
testing or the observation period. While the criminal process requires the
presence of counsel and cross-examination during interviews which may
later be admitted as evidence during trial in the form of depositions, the
civil commitment process has no comparable safeguard.
The commitment proceeding differs from the criminal proceeding in
other ways. First, the involuntary commitment, unlike the criminal sen-
tence, may extend for an indeterminate period of time.83 Second, the
Federal Rules of Evidence limit the circumstances under which a previous
criminal conviction may be admitted into evidence.84 Previous commit-
ment, however, is a part of the individual's case history on which the
diagnosis is based. Moreover, although the criminal defendant may not
be tried twice for the same criminal act, the individual who is the subject
of an involuntary civil commitment proceeding may well find that conduct
which was insufficient to sustain a finding of dangerousness in a previous
commitment hearing will again be considered in a later proceeding in the
form of the individual's case history. Indeed, a single act may constitute
the basis for renewed commitment orders extending well beyond the term
for which a defendant might have been incarcerated.85
Finally, there is a history of pro forma legal representation in the'
involuntary civil commitment process compared to the traditionally vig-
orous adversarial advocacy associated with the criminal process.86 The
83. Although the majority of states now place limitations on the length of initial commitment,
commitment codes also provide procedures whereby commitments may be extended. New Mexico
requires that where the state seeks to extend the commitment, the state must again prove the likelihood
of harm by clear and convincing evidence. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-12(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
But cf. the District of Columbia Code which requires the patient to request a new hearing where he
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous. Jones
v. United States, 463 U.S. at 357, 359 (1983) (citing D.C. Code Ann. §§21-546, 21-547(1981)).
84. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) and 609.
85. Where an individual was found not guilty of shoplifting by reason of insanity, the criminal
act was sufficient to sustain an automatic civil commitment and maintain the commitment until the
patient could establish that he was no longer mentally ill. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354
(1983).
86. C. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE LAW 134, 190-92 (1982);
Andalman and Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a
Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43 (1974); Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the
Commitment of the Mentally Il, 44 TEx. L. REV. 424 (1965). The attorney representing persons at
commitment hearings need not necessarily define 'vigorous representation' as 'getting the patient
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civil commitment client often receives legal representation from a court
appointed attorney ad litem who is paid a flat fee by the state.87 Operating
under a heavy caseload, it is possible that these advocates will never meet
their client prior to the hearing and may not even gain access to their
client's records until the day of the hearing.88 In these situations the
attorney ad litem tends to defer to the judgment of the mental health
professionals seeking commitment; thus, the hearing may function only
to validate the psychiatrist's decision.89 The individual must be in atten-
dance to present his perceptions regarding testimony, preferences, and
objections regarding alternatives to prescribed commitment and treatment,
to have a full opportunity to see that his attorney presents vigorous rep-
resentation of his liberty interests, and to ensure that the state meets its
burden of proof and presents all alternatives to institutionalization.
The value of the presence of the individual during his commitment
hearing is that by personally hearing the evidence and exercising the tools
of confrontation, assisting counsel, and speaking on his own behalf, the
individual can help to ensure that all the necessary evidence and infor-
mation are before the court which must ultimately make an informed
determination and an appropriate disposition.
C. The State's Interest in Civil Commitment
Ordinarily, the state is interested in avoiding a requested procedure
because the procedure will involve time and/or expense. However, a
state's interest in excluding an individual from his commitment hearing
cannot be one of expense or administrative encumbrance. First, a vast
majority of the states, including New Mexico, require a hearing to de-
termine commitment criteria.' No additional expense or procedure is
off.' The attorney must determine the client's wishes in the matter of hospitalization and advocate
that position. The attorney must explain what the state, parent, or mental health professional is
seeking and what the impact will be on the client. The client should be helped to understand the
nature of institutionalization, alternatives and the process by which the client might object. The
attorney also has a role as a negotiator between the patient and mental health professional in which
the attorney can represent the patient's preferences and perceptions of his needs. The attorney can
also present alternatives to full commitment to both the patient and the therapist and help to ensure
that the patient is committed because of his mental condition rather than his financial condition.
More generally, counsel can ensure that mental health professionals are themselves better prepared
for the commitment hearing and that they have thoroughly considered commitment and its alter-
natives. Counsel can also reduce the length and adversarial character of the hearing by working with
the patient and the mental health professionals prior to the hearing to determine an appropriate
commitment. The role of counsel for the patient is discussed by Andalman and Chambers, supra
Cohen, supra Luckasson and Ellis, Representing Institutionalized Mentally Retarded Persons, 7
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REP. 49 (1983), and in Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment
of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 840, 888-890(1974).
87. Cohen, supra note 86 at 430, n. 30.
88. Id. at 428.
89. Id. at 450.
90. Brakel, supra note 4, Tables 2.7 and 2.9.
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required when the individual is present.9 Second, a state has no interest
in committing persons who are not dangerous to themselves or others.92
To the extent that the individual may contribute to the accuracy of the
fact-finding, it is in the better interests of the state to have the individual
in attendance.
Thus, were a state to exclude an individual from his commitment
hearing, its justification in doing so would have to lie in a "best interests"
rationale. Some would argue that the presence of an individual at his
commitment hearing would result in trauma to the emotional well-being
of the individual, and would have a detrimental impact both on relation-
ships with family members who might testify and on the patient-therapist
relationship where the psychologist who appears at the commitment pro-
ceeding will also provide treatment after commitment. To date, no em-
pirical data have been presented to support these contentions.93 It is not
inconceivable that substantial detriment might result to some individuals.
However, there is no indication that it would result for all or even many
91. In New Mexico, the exclusion of the adult or minor would add to the administrative and
economic burden because an additional hearing would be required on the need for exclusion. To
exclude the individual from this additional and crucial proceeding would thwart principles of fairness
by suggesting a presumption that the individual is mentally disabled. If the hearing on a motion to
exclude determined that exclusion was proper, provisions for the supervision of the excluded indi-
vidual would be required, creating yet another expense.
92. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426. It is expensive to provide residential care and treatment. New
Mexico has a further interest in avoiding erroneous commitment where minors are the subject of
the proceedings. Although involuntary commitment of adults is limited by the notion of danger-
ousness, New Mexico does not limit commitment of minors to those who are dangerous but seeks
to assist any child in need of services for mental disorders or developmental disabilities (N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 43-1-16.1 (B)and (G) (Repl. Pamp. 1984)). Considerable expense is incurred in the provision
of services to such a potentially large population.
93. Forman, Measures for Evaluating Total Family Functioning, II FAM. THERAPY I (1984).
Further, there is evidence that where a family is seeking commitment of a minor child, the family
relationships may already be in distress and the family may be seeking relief via commitment.
ScHETKEY & BENEDEK, CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1980). The elevated incidence of divorce
among parents of children with special needs and the evidence of increased stress in families which
have a mentally ill or developmentally disabled member, suggests that families who have troubled
youngsters are in distress well before they enter the legal system. LOVE, THE MENTALLY RETARDED
CHILD AND His FAMILY (1973). (Love reports that the divorce rate among couples who have a
mentally retarded child is three times as high as among couples who have children of normal
intelligence.) Anderson and Lynch, A Family Impact Analysis: The Deinstitutionalization of the
Mentally Ill, 33 J. FAM. RELATIONS 41 (1984) (the more contact with a mentally ill family member,
the greater the feelings of lack of support, disintegration of family, and missed opportunities); Longo
and Band, Families of Handicapped Children: Research and Practice, 33 FAM. RELATIONS 57 (1984)
(increased signs and effects of stress with the presence of a handicapped child); Cmis, Adaptation
of Families with Mentally Retarded Children: A Model of Stress, Coping, and Family Ecology, 88
AM. J. OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY 125 (1983) (parents of mentally retarded children are more depressed
and have greater problems in impulse control and control of aggressive feelings than parents of
children of normal intelligence); Schilling, Coping and Social Support in Families of Developmentally
Disabled Children, 33 J. FAM. RELATIONS 47 (1984) (more frequent occurrence of poor health,
exhaustion, quarreling, adjustment failure, desertion, and divorce among families who have a men-
tally retarded child).
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of the persons who are the subjects of commitment proceedings.94 Indeed,
the sixth amendment guarantees are so vital to the prevention of erroneous
convictions that the Supreme Court applied them to quasi-criminal pro-
ceedings involving the liberty and liability of minors as well, rejecting
the notion that procedural safeguards inhibit the ability of the court to
act in the best interests of children.95 Some members of the mental health
community believe greater harm would result from deceiving mentally
ill patients about the nature and purpose of the psychiatric examination
in commitment proceedings than from the application of procedural safe-
guards of patient rights.96 There is also support for the premise that a
hearing is of therapeutic benefit to the patient.97
D. Limitations on the Right to be Present During the Commitment
Hearing
Given the potentially extreme consequences of commitment to an
institution" and the potential for erroneous commitment," the individual
who is the subject of an involuntary civil commitment proceeding should
be accorded every tool to protect his liberty interest, including the right
to be present to assist his counsel and fully confront the evidence against
his interests. Just as there are circumstances where the right to be present
during a criminal proceeding is limited, there are instances when presence
should be limited in the civil commitment proceeding. Limitations on
presence are appropriate where the patient voluntarily waives the right
94. No empirical data are available to show that the patient-therapist relationship will be impaired.
The situation might be compared to the suspicions that arose surrounding the concept of informed
consent for medical procedures. Physicians were concerned that by informing patients of risks
involved in various treatment that the patient's anxieties would increase and their confidence in their
physician's competence would plummet, resulting in patients foregoing necessary treatment. Letter
to the editor, 296 NEW ENG. J. MED. 517 (1977). Follow-up studies have shown these fears did not
materialize. Kaufman, 17 Soc. ScI. AND MED., 1657 (1983).
When the Supreme Court considered the procedures which were constitutionally adequate in
juvenile quasi-criminal proceedings, similar fears were voiced; but the detrimental consequences did
not occur. ScHETKEY & BENEDEK, CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1980).
95. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967).
96. Brooks, The Lawyer as Mental Health Professional, 54 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 163 (1982).
97. The airing of differences and conflicts may well have a therapeutic benefit which aids in the
development of a stronger family unit. SCHETKEY & BENEDEK, CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
(1980). A hearing may be therapeutic for the minor patient as well. A hearing gives the child an
opportunity to express his objection in a meaningful manner, it may help to crystallize the need for
treatment in the eyes of the child; it can help the child to feel he has been treated fairly and that he
has some input over his destiny; it helps the child become involved in planning for his care and it
establishes in the mind of the child that his behaviors and their required therapy are serious concerns.
Meisel & Roth, The Child'sRight to Object to Hospitalization: Some Empirical Data. 4 J. PSYCHIATRY
AND LAW 377 (1976); Ensminger and Ligouri, The Therapeutic Significance of the Civil Commitment
Hearing: An Unexplored Potential, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 37 (1979); 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW
REP. 99 n. 166.
98. See supra notes 38-55 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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or where his behavior is so disruptive that the proceeding cannot continue.
The state has an interest in conducting any hearing with decorum and
in a manner conducive to fully exploring the facts.'" To the extent that
an individual's conduct interferes with that interest, the individual may
be excluded from the hearing. This would require that the individual be
permitted to attend the hearing initially. To do otherwise would be equiv-
alent to prejudging the finding of mental disability. Furthermore, the court
must distinguish behavior which is so disruptive that the proceeding
cannot continue from behavior which is merely bizarre or eccentric and
which evokes a visceral reaction in others.
The state also has an interest in protecting the individual's right to
voluntarily absent himself from the proceeding.'0 ' His reasons might
include the belief that to attend would be harmful to his condition and
the belief that his presence might prejudice the outcome.' 2 Under these
circumstances, the individual should be permitted to waive his right to
be present. However, the waiver of a constitutionally protected right must
be "an intentional relinquishment . . . of a known right or privilege"
judged by the circumstances surrounding the waiver, including the "back-
ground, experience, and conduct of the accused."'°3 While there is no
single standard for determining the sufficiency of a waiver, courts consider
age, mental competence at the time of the waiver, intelligence, presence
of counsel at time of waiver, and duress when determining the voluntar-
iness of waivers in the criminal context. "0
Courts should carefully scrutinize the voluntariness of any waiver in
the context of civil commitment as well for several reasons. First, the
issue which brings the parties into the commitment proceeding may be
the individual's ability to make decisions and manage his life competently;
100. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
101. Stromberg and Stone, supra note 70 at 337.
102. Some conditions result in a physical appearance which does not reflect an individual's
competence. An example is dysarthria, a condition affecting the control of muscles involved in
speech, eating, and facial expression. BANISTER, BRAIN's CLINICAL NEUROLOGY 105-6 (1973). An
observer might be influenced more by the appearance of the individual who may drool or display
no facial affect in response to the proceedings, than by the facts of the individual's ability to function
independently.
103. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
104. This "totality of the circumstances" test is applied to waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) and waiver of the right to counsel, Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Courts may consider the defendant's age, Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596 (1948); mental capacity, Davis v. State of North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); and the
use of mental coercion, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 407 (1977). Where the accused appears
to have waived the privilege against self-incrimination, courts apply a balancing test which considers
1) the defendant's mental capacity, 2) the presence of any external factors such as coercion, and 3)
the relationship between the defendant's mental capacity and the external factors. Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 604-605 (1961). The waiver of the right to a jury trial in the federal
system is discussed in Note, Waiver of Jury Trials in Federal Criminal Cases: A Reassessment of
the "Prosecutional Veto," 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 1091 (1983).
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where competence is the reason for which commitment is sought, a court
should carefully review the voluntariness and competence of any waiver.
Second, the individual whose competency is in question may be especially
vulnerable to suggestions offered by family or mental health professionals
whose interests may differ from those of the individual and who may be
in positions to influence his decisions. One commentator suggests that
the court might rely on the individual's attorney to determine whether
the waiver ought to be permitted. '05 However, the court should consider
the extent of the attorney's familiarity with the individual and his case
prior to accepting counsel's recommendation regarding sufficiency of the
waiver. 106
Other occasions for proceeding in the absence of the individual demand
careful scrutiny. Respect for the individual requires rejection of a cursory
conclusion that an individual who is incapable of understanding the pro-
ceedings or of assisting his counsel may be excluded because his presence
would be useless. '07 Rather than excluding an individual whose disability
may result in difficulty in understanding the proceedings or assisting his
counsel, fairness requires that courts and counsel attempt to increase the
105. Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals for Change, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY
LAW REP. 73, 99 (1977).
106. Some attorneys may believe that persons with mental disorders are generally unable to decide
what is best for themselves; such attorneys may be tempted to represent to the court their own
judgment about what would be in the client's best interests. C. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST
RESORT, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE LAW 140 (1982). The authority to make decisions regarding the
merits of a case belong to the client and the lawyer is ethically bound to exert his best efforts to
ensure that the client has been informed of all considerations. The lawyer must be careful to determine
the client's real preferences. The client may be especially vulnerable to suggestions offered by family
or mental health professionals who may be in positions of power; the lawyer should make every
effort to determine that the client's will has not been usurped. See Luckasson and Ellis, Representing
Institutionalized Mentally Retarded Persons, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REP. 49 (1983).
107. It may be tempting to apply a test of competency similar to the Dusky test of competency
to stand trial to the right to attend one's commitment hearing. The test applied to competency to
stand trial is whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual under-
standing of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
The application of the Dusky criteria to the involuntary commitment proceeding would undermine
the notion of fairness on which both attendance and the concept of competence to stand trial are
founded. Competency to stand trial is determined in a hearing separate from the trial at which the
judge considers all relevant evidence including the judge's perception of the defendant as he observes
him during the competency hearing.
See generally, Boyle and Baughman, The Mental State of the Accused: Through a Glass Darkly,
65 MICH. B.J. 78 (1986). Where competency is restored within the statutory requirements, the
defendant will stand trial. Id. A determination of competency to stand trial does not affect the
defendant's sixth amendment right to be present when he is tried. Moreover, because the competency
hearing derives from the criminal proceeding, the individual may have a constitutionally protected
right to attend the competency hearing as well. The concept of competency to stand trial is rooted
in notions of fairness and was developed to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, not to limit
that right. To apply the Dusky test of competency or a standard similar to it to the determination of
whether an individual should attend a proceeding in which the State seeks to restrict liberty would
have the effect of limiting rather than protecting the exercise of a right.
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meaningfulness of attendance at the civil commitment proceeding. To
that end, every effort should be made to determine the extent to which
the individual's ability to understand and to assist might be enhanced by
such aids as an interpreter for the deaf, the attendance of a friend or staff
member familiar with the individual's speech patterns, or devices such
as language boards. °8 Appropriate assistance would enhance both the
meaningfulness of the proceedings and the accuracy of the determination.
The court should also scrutinize any recommendation that exclusion is
in the individual's best interests. The problems inherent in the accuracy
of the diagnosis'09 suggest that it will be difficult to establish that exclusion
would be in the individual's best interests or that these considerations
would outweigh the notions of fairness inherent in attendance, particularly
where it is the initial commitment proceeding. In a proceeding to extend
the commitment of an individual who is already confined, a recommen-
dation that the patient be excluded should be considered equally carefully.
Once the impression has been formed that a patient is mentally ill, the
expectation arises that he will continue to be mentally ill."' The court,
then, should closely review any recommendation that it would be in an
individual's best interests to be excluded from the involuntary civil com-
mitment hearing or that it would be useless for an individual to attend a
proceeding that so profoundly affects his interests."'
IV. CONCLUSION
The determination of the need to commit an individual is fact-intensive
and relies on subjective opinion and information obtained from persons
108. A language board is a device which enables persons who are unable to speak or write to
communicate through visual representations. This device is one of many mechanical and electronic
devices currently available to facilitate communication for persons with various handicapping con-
ditions. In some cases it might be necessary to move the hearing to the institution or some other
place to accommodate the individual. Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital, 384 F. Supp. 1085
(E.D. Mich. 1974); In re Watson, 91 Cal. App. 3d 455, 154 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1979). A number of
state codes grant the judge discretion as to the place of the hearing. Brakel, supra note 4, Table
2.7.
109. See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
110. Rosenhan, On Being Sane In Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973): "Once a person is
designated abnormal, all of his other behaviors and characteristics are colored by that label. Indeed,
the label is so powerful that many of the pseudo-patients' normal behaviors were overlooked entirely
or profoundly misinterpreted." Id. at 253. See also Szasz, The Child As Involuntary Mental Patient:
The Threat of Child Therapy to a Child's Dignity, Privacy, and Self-Esteem, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1005, 1012 (1977).
111. Minors have the same interests in avoiding erroneous confinement as adults have. The value
of the minor's presence in enhancing the accuracy and fairness of the proceeding may be as great
as the adult's presence is. It should not be presumed that all children are incapable of assisting their
attorneys, nor that all children will be affected detrimentally by attending the hearing. Where the
client is a minor, a number of approaches might be considered as alternatives to excluding any minor
upon the motion of any interested party as the amendment proposed would have provided. See supra
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whose interests both diverge from those of the individual who is facing
commitment and are directly affected by his commitment. The risk of
erroneous findings is substantial. Given the consequent loss of liberty,potential debilitation, social stigma, and expense of involuntary civil
commitment both societal and individual interests are served by proce-
dures which facilitate a fair and accurate determination of the appropri-
ateness of commitment. The right to be present is as fundamental to thedue process goals of fairness and accuracy in the context of involuntary
civil commitment proceedings as it is in the context of criminal pro-
ceedings. By personally hearing the evidence and assisting counsel to
expose motive and conflicts of interests and to challenge disputed facts,
the individual can help to ensure that all the evidence which is necessary
to an appropriate disposition is before the court. Notions of fairness
inherent in due process surely require procedures which permit an indi-
vidual to witness a proceeding of such enormous personal consequence.
E. KIRSTEN LUNDERGAN
note 2, HB143. At least two courts have found that where there is a statutory provision for a minor
to seek treatment voluntarily, then the age at which that power attaches is the age at which statutory
safeguards accorded adults attaches. Melville v. Sabbatino, 30 Conn. Supp. 320, 313 A.2d. 886(1973) (where a minor between the ages of 16 and 18 has the statutory right to admit himself fortreatment, he also has the right to be released upon his independent petition even though he was
admitted by his parents pursuant to the voluntary admissions procedures prior to age 16); In reSmith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d. 238 (1972) (where a minor has the statutory right to seek and
consent to medical treatment, such as abortion, she cannot be compelled by her parent to accept
treatment). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized this "mature minor" doctrine in PlannedParenthood of Cent. Miss. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622(1979). Many states also recognize that the preference of a minor of a certain age should be consideredin awarding custody. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental In-
stitutions, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 840, 881 (1974).
The New Mexico Code provides that children who are 12 years of age or older may seek voluntary
commitment without the consent of a parent or guardian. N.M. STAT. ANN. §43-1-16(B) (Repl.Pamp. 1984). Thus, New Mexico applies the mature minor doctrine to civil commitment, acknowl-
edging that at age 12 some youngsters have sufficient competence and maturity to recognize the
need for and to seek treatment. That application of the mature minor doctrine should encompass the
concept that he is also competent to object to commitment and able to assist counsel in presenting
the issues such as whether he should be in residential treatment, the accuracy of the testimony ofthose seeking his commitment, whether the treatment plan is adequate, and whether he is actually
receiving the prescribed services.
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